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Corporate Social Reporting and Board Representation: Evidence from the 




The paper examines the influence of gender and board representation on 
communication of corporate social reporting by Kenyan banks.  The 
descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the level of corporate social 
disclosure by Kenyan banks is low with a mean of 15%, indicating that 
disclosure of corporate governance information is not of primary concern to 
Kenyan banks. In particular, there is a complete lack of disclosure on the 
categories of Recruitments, Employment of Special Groups, Assistance to Retiring 
Employees, Employees Productivity and Turnover. The results of multiple 
regression analysis indicate that board representation can fundamentally 
improve corporate communication. A higher level of women representation 
and independent directors greatly improves disclosure.   
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1 Introduction and motivation 
This paper examines important issues of gender representation, improved 
corporate social reporting and corporate governance practices in the annual 
reports of the banks. Specifically, the paper addresses two related research 
questions: first, what is the extent of Kenyan banks’ disclosure of corporate 
social information in annual reports; and, second, what factors explain the 
level of disclosure of corporate social information by Kenyan banks. 
 
 Within the context of corporate social reporting research, this study is of 
special importance because of its specific gender, industry and country focus. 
Prior accounting disclosure research often excludes banking and finance 
institutions from their sample due to the stringent regulatory requirements 
associated with this sector (Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994, Ismail & Chandler, 
2005, Khalid, 2005, Leung & Horwitz, 2004). This paper seeks to fill this gap 
by providing an insight into corporate social reporting practices of this vitally 
important sector.  Importantly, this study also focuses on Kenya, and in the 
broad context of developing country studies, contributes to the growing 
number of empirical disclosure research on the developing economies 
(Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006, Khalid, 2005, Owusu-Ansah, 1998). While it is 
always difficult to generalise the findings of one specific country to others, 
this Kenyan- specific study is important in that it adds to the accumulation of 
developing country knowledge about corporate social reporting (Brown, 
Purushothaman, Scharl. and Astami, 2007) 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the 
corporate governance and corporate social reporting environment in Kenya. 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework and literature review, while 
Section 4 outlines with the research design. The research findings are 
reviewed in Section 5. The final section highlights the implications of the 
results.  
  
2 Corporate governance and corporate social reporting1 
 
Since the focus of this research is on social reporting, it is appropriate to 
provide a brief overview of the regulatory framework in the Kenyan context. 
The Kenyan Companies Act sets the general framework for corporate 
financial reporting. The pronouncements by the Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (ICPAK) supplement the requirements of the Kenya Companies 
Act.  
 
To date, in the Kenyan context, corporate social and environment reporting is 
voluntary. The Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG) Kenya is the main 
driving force with respect to corporate governance reforms in Kenya. The 
Centre was established in 1999, and also serves as serves as Secretariat to the 
Pan African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance. In 2005 CCG 
                                                 
1 For further details on corporate governance and corporate financial reporting environment in Kenya see Barako et 
al. 2006. 
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issued guidelines on corporate financial reporting and disclosure. For 
companies, adoption of the guidelines is voluntary. The guidelines made 
reference to corporate social reporting as follows: 
…disclose in summary the nature of the enterprise's social responsibility and 
corporate citizenship activities, environmental, occupational health and safety, 
and workforce management policies and practices, and whether the enterprise 
has in place a code of ethics, and the general level of adherence to this code 
(The Centre for Corporate Governance, 2005)   
 
Given the voluntary nature of corporate social reporting, it is not surprising 
that in a survey of governance practices in the banking sector The Centre for 
Corporate Governance (2004) note that “only 3 banks have corporate social 
responsibility programmes” (p.47).  
 
In terms of governance, women’s participation is very low. In this respect The 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)2 under the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) country report for Kenya states: 
…evidence of gender marginalisation in the country is that women 
remain vastly under-represented…women in Kenya comprise a 
majority, accounting for 42 percent of the population and 65 percent of 
the country’s registered voters. Although the current government has 
appointed more women to cabinet and nominated more women to 
parliament than previously done, the numbers are still dismal [3/26] 
Women Cabinet Ministers, [4/39] Assistant Ministers, 6/25 Permanent 
Secretaries, 18/222 Members of Parliament, 0/8 Provincial 
Commissioners, 2/71 District Commissioners and 8/57 Judges(African 
Peer Review Mechanism, 2006) (APRM 2006, p. 22 and 109).  
 
                                                 
2 NEPAD is new initiative undertaken by African countries to address the challenges facing the continent such as, 
poverty, underdevelopment, peace and security. For further details see http://www.nepad.org/. APRM is a 
mutually agreed instrument to assess a member country on a number of socio-economic fronts.  
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It is against this background that gender is the main thrust of board diversity 
examined in this study with respect to corporate reporting practices.   
3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Stakeholder theory posits that an entity strives to harmonise its activities with 
stakeholder expectations through the communicative channel of corporate 
social reporting. Stakeholder theory may be divided into managerial 
(positive) and ethical (normative) branches (Deegan, 2000). The managerial 
branch posits that managers will be influenced by the powers of particular 
stakeholders on the business activities of an organisation (O'Dwyer, 2002). 
Under the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, key stakeholder demands 
are given considerable weight by managers when generating corporate social 
reports.  Thus, in the Kenyan banking context, we might expect core-financial 
stakeholders (for example, investors, creditors and shareholders) having 
considerable influence over banks’ actions and reporting.  
 
The ethical branch of stakeholder theory argues that all stakeholders have 
rights to fair treatment, regardless of how distant or close the stakeholder is to 
the business (Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2000). Conveying information to 
satisfy the needs of all stakeholders is, of course, difficult but the ethical 
branch would suggest that an appropriate conceptual framework of 
reporting, for example in the Kenyan banking sector, would be for Kenyan 
banks to engage in social reporting to legitimise their business activities in 
line with as many stakeholder groups’ expectations as possible.  
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Donaldson (1999; p. 237) suggests there many be enough “conceptual glue” to 
converge these two branches of stakeholder theory. Donaldson and Preston 
(1995; p. 66) aver that there remains the possibility that the different branches 
of stakeholder theory are “mutually supportive”. In light of the potential 
merging of these theoretical branches as one, this paper adopts Driver and 
Thompson’s 2002; p. 114) sense of stakeholding with its many laden meanings 
as “the sense of strengthening the company”.  
  
In considering the extent and explanation of Kenyan banks’ disclosure of 
corporate social information in annual reports it is salient to address the issue 
of disclosures in the twin contexts of banks and developing countries. Until 
recently, the banking sector has generally been considered to have little social 
and environmental impact (Elkington, 1994). However, this perception is 
changing dramatically, essentially because of the sectors vital role in 
economic development and sustainability. In this respect, Moyo and Rohan 
(2006) states: 
The financial services sector plays a critical role in promoting 
sustainable development through its financial intermediation. 
Increasingly, the process of financing business activities is being seen 
as a way to stimulate the business sector to control its broader 
environmental, social and economic impacts (p.289). 
 
Hence to conform to the society’s expectation banks must integrate 
environmental and social impacts as part of core investment risk evaluations 
and therefore, influence a number of related institutions.  
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Few studies examined corporate social reporting in the banking industry. 
Douglas, Doris and Johnson (2004) studied corporate social reporting in the 
annual reports, and on the web sites of six Irish financial institutions. Their 
findings suggest that the quantity and quality of social information disclosed 
is far less than leading European banks. They also observed that greater 
amount of information is provided on the website than in the annual report. 
They attribute low disclosure of social information to voluntary nature of the 
reporting regime in Ireland. 
 
Although CSR research has been the subject of immense study for the past 
few decades, the empirical studies dealt mainly with the developed Western 
economies (Tsang, 1998). A small body of empirical studies is emerging 
among a number of developing countries. For example, in a recent study, 
Ratanajongkol, Harvey and Low (2006) examined corporate social reporting 
in Thailand. They examined the extent and nature of corporate social 
reporting of 40 Thai companies over 3 year period. Overall, they found that 
the level of corporate social reporting is increasing, with Thai companies 
reporting more on human resources. 
 
A number of prior studies have examined determinants of corporate 
disclosure practices. These studies can be split broadly into two categories, 
namely, mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory disclosure research mainly 
concerns compliance with as well as comprehensiveness of disclosure of 
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statutory disclosure requirements (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994, Owusu-Ansah, 
1998, Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994). Voluntary disclosure studies deals with 
discretionary release of financial and non-financial information over and 
above the mandatory requirements (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987, Cooke, 1991, 
Hossain & Adams, 1995, Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995). A prominent 
feature of disclosure research is concentration on the developed western 
economies. However, disclosure research in developing countries is growing 
(Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994, Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006, Belal, 2000, Chow & 
Wong-Boren, 1987, Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994, Owusu-Ansah, 1998, 
Wallace, 1988). 
 
In recent years, voluntary disclosure studies have branched into finer, more 
focused research, areas such as environmental and social disclosure (Belal, 
2000, Belal, 2001, Disu & Gray, 1998, Kisenyi & Gray, 1998), human resource 
(Brown, Tower, & Taplin, 2005), intellectual capital (Williams, 2001) and 
corporate governance issues (Haniffa and Cooke 2002, Barako et al. 2006). The 
results of these studies are mixed. However, a consistent finding in previous 
research is that firm size is an important determinant of corporate social 
reporting practices. For instance, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in a meta-
analysis of 29 disclosure studies find that size, listing status and financial 
leverage are predictors of levels of disclosure in corporate annual reports. It is 
evident that different aspects of corporate governance attributes influence 
corporate reporting practices (Barako et al. 2006). This research draws on 
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prior studies to investigate the influence of corporate governance attributes 
on corporate social reporting practices of Kenyan banks. Corporate 
governance characteristics3 examined are: independence of board (board 
composition), proportion of foreign nationals on the board and proportion of 
women on the board.  
 
Board composition is represented by the proportion of non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors on the board. Non-executive 
directors are regarded as a reliable mechanism capable of diffusing agency 
conflicts between managers and owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). They are 
viewed as providing the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance 
board effectiveness (Franks, Mayer, & Renneboog, 2001). Prior research 
studies present empirical evidence of the relationship between proportion of 
non-executive directors on board and the level of voluntary disclosure (Chen 
& Jaggi, 2000, Eng & Mak, 2003, Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Thus, consistent with 
past findings, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1: The higher the proportion of non-executive directors, the higher the level 
of voluntary disclosure of corporate social reporting  information.  
 
In recent years board diversity has become a critical component of corporate 
governance structure. The theme of board diversity fits well into the 
framework of stakeholder theory. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) argue 
in favour of board diversity that “[it] increases board independence because 
with a different gender, ethnicity, or cultural background might ask questions 
                                                 
3 Central Bank of Kenya requires all banks to separate the position and role of board chair and CEO, as well as 
establish board audit committee. Thus, due to the statutory requirements, variables such as board audit committee 
and board leadership structure are not considered in this study. 
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that would not come from directors with more traditional backgrounds” 
(p.37). Carter et al. (2003) present empirical evidence of a significant positive 
relationship between board diversity, defined as percentage of women, 
African American, Asians, and Hispanics on board of directors and firm 
value. In addition, prior research indicates that board diversity, as measured 
by the presence of women directors, is associated with stronger orientation 
toward corporate social reporting (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994), and higher 
levels of social performance (Siciliano, 1996). Recruiting more women to 
corporate boards may bring about diversity of opinions and perspectives to 
board discussions. For example, a woman director summarised the 
importance of women on a company board as follows: 
Women have a different perspective and I think as a group they 
have a different set of skills. If you are putting a team together then 
you need a team which has a wide base of skills. By not having a 
true representation…then you are cutting yourself from half of the 
resource pool. In my experience women have had much better 
communication and people skill and in some ways lateral thinking 
skills (Shilton, McGregor, & Tremaine, 1996). 
Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000, cited in Walt & Ingley, 2003 p. 226) further 
illustrate the contribution of women on corporate board as follows: 
Despite the fear cited by many CEOs that women will disrupt an 
otherwise cooperative boardroom climate by raising difficult 
women’s issue in an adversarial manner as a reason for not hiring 
women directors, and despite women directors’ own 
consciousness of being perceived as a having a women’s agenda 
or being single-issue woman, these women recognise their 
responsibility to address issues relating to women’s recruitment, 
retention, development and advancement in organisations and 
see these as appropriate business issues for board discussion 
(Walt & Ingley, 2003).  
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Adams and Ferreira (2004; p. 3) suggest that boards with a higher proportion 
of women directors have more board meetings and different attendance 
patterns at board meetings which make diverse boards more effective than 
homogenous boards. Adams and Ferreira (2004; p. 11) argue that “women are 
intrinsically more “stabilizing” than men.  In terms of gender-related 
boardroom dynamics, Huse and Solberg (2006) concluded that women could 
contribute to boards by creating alliances, preparing and involving 
themselves in board matters, attending the important decision-making arenas 
and being visible.  
 
In terms of disclosures made by a board with foreign nationals,  Wallace & 
Naser (1995) did not find a significant relationship between disclosure levels 
and boards dominated by directors of non-Chinese background, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) document empirical evidence of the positive association 
between the proportion of Malay directors on the board and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by Malaysian companies. In a country with two distinct 
ethnic groups: Malay and Chinese, their finding suggests that ethnic 
orientation impacts on firms’ corporate reporting practices. 
 
The association between the proportion of foreign nationals and disclosures in 
the prior litertature raises the issue of causality. Causality of board diversity was 
considered by Fields and Keys (2003) who found that heterogeneity of 
experiences, ideas and innovations that individuals bring to a company 
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impacts on company performance. Erhandt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) argue 
that ethnic representation on boards increases firm financial performance, 
while Ayuso and Argandona (2007) argue that women and foreign directors 
are usually assumed to play an important role in favouring corporate social 
reporting strategies.  In line with these arguments, this paper argues that it is 
likely that board diversity measured as percentage of women and foreign 
national (non-Kenyans) on the board of directors may influence corporate 
reporting behaviour of banks. Hence, the following hypotheses are examined: 
 
H2: The higher the proportion of women directors on the board, the higher the 
level of voluntary disclosure of corporate social reporting information.  
 
H3: The higher the proportion of foreign nationals on the board, the higher the 
level of voluntary disclosure of corporate social reporting information.  
 
Non-performing loan ratio is included as a control variable as non-
performing loans are a fundamental aspect of the banking sector which is 
central to this study’s research question. Credit risk, is arguably, the most 
critical risk factor in the Kenyan financial sector with a huge level of non-
performing loans. The Kenyan Government has been exploring ways to 
alleviate this problem. In this respect, a local daily newspaper reports on 
Kenyan government initiative as follows “…mandated the Central Bank of 
Kenya to explore the feasibility of forming a Non-Performing Loans Agency 
to help clean up bank balance sheets…” (Mburu, 2003). In addition, as per 
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Central Bank of Kenya guidelines, bank board of directors are required to 
develop and approve credit risk policy4. 
 
4 Research Design 
This section explains source of the data, measurement of the dependent 
variable and operational definition of independent variables. 
 
Data Source 
An annual report of banks is the primary source of data for this research. The 
entire population of 40 Kenyan banks is included in the sample5.  
Dependent Variable 
This research uses a corporate social reporting disclosure index to measure 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. The list of the disclosure items are drawn 
from past corporate social disclosure studies. The index however, is crafted to 
suit social issues that are pertinent to the Kenyan environment, such as 
combating the HIV/AIDS.   
 
A binary coding technique is used, with a score of 1 if an item is disclosed and 
0 if not. This is consistent with prior disclosure scoring approach (Cooke, 
1991, Cooke, 1992, Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995). The unweighted 
                                                 
4 With respect to board oversight role, the Central Bank of Kenya risk management guidelines reads; “The board of 
directors carries the ultimate responsibility of approving and reviewing the credit risk strategy and credit risk 
policies of the bank. This role is part of the board’s ultimate responsibility of offering overall strategic direction of the 
bank “(p. 13). 
5 While a total of 40 banks in the sample may appear low, they do represent the entire population facilitating the ease 
with which to make conclusions about the data.  
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disclosure index has the advantage of reducing subjectivity in assigning 
weights to the disclosure items. To get a company’s score, the scores for each 
item are added and the total is divided by the maximum possible score, and 
multiplied by a hundred to gather the percentage scores. In this study, the 
number of disclosure items is 22 which represents the maximum possible 
disclosure score. Thus, for example, if a bank discloses 11 out of 22 items, the 
score for the dependent variable is 50%.  The average score is calculated by 
dividing the number of banks disclosing a particular item by the total number 
of items.  Consistent with previous studies (Barako et al, 2006), all items are 
equally weighted.  
 
 
Independent Variables  
The corporate governance variables examined in this study are: board 
composition (independence of board), gender representation on board, 
foreign nationals on board and non-performing loan ratio, which is a control 
variable. Table 1 presents a summary of the operational definition of these 
predictor variables. The independent variable of ratio of non-executive 
directors on board is represented by the ratio of non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors on the board.  The independent variable of women 
representation on the board is the ratio of the number of women directors to 
the total number of directors on the board. The independent variable of 
foreign nationals on boards is the ration of non-Kenyan directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. A necessary limitation of this study is that 
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it does not delineate the countries these foreign directors come from.  Another 
necessary limitation of this study is that it does not consider the number of 
board members or other ownership variables. While they are of interest to this 
study, addition of such variables is limited by the small sample size of the 
data set.  
 
The board composition is comprised of executive and non-executive directors.  
 
Table 1. Operational definition of independent variables 
Independent variables Operational definition Source of information 
Ratio of non-executive 
directors on board 
Ratio of non-executive 
directors to total number of 
directors on the board 
 
Banks’ annual report 
Women representation on 
board 
Ratio of women directors to 
total number of directors 
on the board 
 
Banks’ annual reports 
Foreign national on boards Ratio of non-Kenyan 
directors to total number of 
directors on the board 
 
Banks’ annual reports 
Control variable   
Non-performing loan ratio Ratio of Non-performing 
loan  to total loans 





Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are contained in Table 2. 
Board composition which is measured by the proportion of non-executive 
directors to total number of directors indicates that most banks have a 
majority of non-executive directors on the board with a mean of 59%. 
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However, some financial institutions are dominated by executive directors. 
Non-performing loan ratio indicates great disparities among financial 
institutions with a low of 1.6% and a high of 83.2%.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of predictor variables 
 








Independence of Board 58.70 0.00 91.7 24.44 
Gender representation on 
board 
4.18 0.00 27.30 8.18 
Foreign national on boards 22.52 0.00 100.00 29.76 
Non-performing loan ratio 20.07 1.60 83.20 18.52 




% of banks 
No women on board 30 75.00 
1 woman on board 5 12.50 
2 women on board 3 7.50 
3 women on board 2 5.00 
More than 3 women on 
board 
0 0.00 
Total  40 100.00 
 
On average the ratio of foreign directors on bank boards is 23%. Though a 
minority, some banks, mostly foreign owned financial institutions have 
boards comprised entirely of foreign nationals. 
The highest percentage of women representation on bank boards is 27% with 
a mean of only 4%. A further analysis in Panel B of Table 3 presents a clear 
picture. 75% of Kenyan banks have no women on their boards, with only two 
banks (constituting 5% of the sample population) having at least three women 
on their Board of Directors. Gender representation on boards of Kenyan banks 
reflects the global concerns of low women representation on corporate 
 18
boards. For example,  Thomas (2001) undertaking an empirical longitudinal 
study of women representation on the boards of British retailing companies 
concludes that men not only dominate board membership but also key 
positions of Board chair and Chief Executive. 
In Australia, Korn/Ferry International (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002) note that 
most of the top 20 companies had at least one woman on the board. Overall, 
the number of women represented on boards is very low. Moreover, there is 
no difference in results whether there are one, two or three women on the 
board, and these women are usually professionally-oriented.  In Canada, 
Burke (1993) observes that 5 percent of board members are women. Kesner 
(Burke, 1993) examine the 250 largest companies in the US with a total of 3128 
board members, and concludes that 3.6 (113) percent are women. Brennan & 
McCafferty (1997) finds that women comprise 4.3% of total directors of the 
Irish public and semi-state owned enterprises. Similarly, Pajo, McGregory & 
Cleland (1997), notes that women constitute only 4.4% of the total number of 
directors of the top 200 New Zealand companies.   
Table 4 contain list of items included in the corporate social disclosure index. 
Consistent with the overall low mean disclosure score of 15%, it is clearly 
evident that banks disclose very limited social information in the annual 
report. In particular, no banks disclosure recruitments, employment of special 
groups, assistance to retiring employees, employees productivity and 
turnover. In addition, very few banks, 12.50% and 0.03% respectively disclose 
information relating to environment policy and environmental activities they 
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undertake, while only 3 banks contribute to the national AIDS campaign. 
Overall, Table 3 highlights the extreme low levels of important attached to 
social information reporting by banks. 
Table 3. List of social disclosure items 
 
Social disclosures index #. of Banks 
disclosing 
% 
1. Donation of cash, products and employees service to 
support community programs 
 
15 37.5 
2. Contribution towards national AIDS campaign 
 
3 9.37 
3. Support for staff affected by AIDS 
 
3 9.37 
4. Employees’ appreciation 
 
27 84.37 
5. Discussion of employees’ welfare 
 
5 15.63 
6. Sponsorship of public health program/activities 
 
4 12.50 
7. Policy on employees’ training 
 
8 25.00 
8. Nature of training 3 9.37 
9. Recruitment challenges 
 
0 0.00 
10. Funding scholarship program 
 
6 18.75 
11. Contribution towards national problems/issues 
e.g. famine relief, people affected by wars 
 
8 25.00 
12. Corporate environmental policy 
 
4 12.50 
13. Environmental projects/activities undertaken 
 
1 0.03 




15. Assistance and guidance to retiring employees or 
those declared redundant 
 
0  0.00 




17. Providing qualifications of employees recruited 
 
3 9.37 
18. Providing statistics per employee e.g. asset per 
employee, sales per employee. 
0  0.00 
19. Information and statistics on employee turnover 
 
0 0.00 
20. Supporting nation pride e.g. sponsorship of the 1 0.03 
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Olympic team, the national soccer team. 
 
21. Part-time of employment of students 
 
0 0.00 
22. Statement of corporate social responsibility 
 
1 0.03 
                                             AVERAGE  15% 
Table 4 present the Pearson correlations between the study’s variables. 
Disclosure of corporate social information is positively associated with 
proportion of women on the board, consistent with the hypothesis. The 
significant correlation coefficient of 0.410 (p<0.001) provides some evidence of 
a univariate relationship between disclosure of corporate social information 
and representation of women on the board. Although Pearson correlations 
show a negative correlation coefficients of 0.520, this correlation value is well 
below the critical limits of 0.80 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black 1995), and 
it is suggested that a multicollinearity problem between these independent 
variables is not a serious concern. 
 
This result supports the need to undertake a more powerful statistical 
analysis to reveal predictors of voluntary corporate social reporting 
disclosure. In the following section results of multiple regression analysis are 
discussed.  
 
Table 4. Pearson correlation matrix 
 










Board composition  
Foreigners on Board  
Women on Board  





















      
* p < 0.01, two-tailed, ** p < 0.05, two-tailed 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression is used to examine the relationship between the 
dependent variable described as the level of disclosure of social information 
and the three corporate governance variables.  The results of the regression 
model are provided in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5. Multiple regression analysis 
 













Women on Board + 0.499 0.002** 1.046 
Foreigners on Board  + 0.308 0.099 1.652 









   
Legend: ** highly significant; * significant 
 
The board composition variable is significantly (p < 0.05) associated with the 
extent of social information disclosed in the banks annual reports. The higher 
the number of independent members on the bank board, the higher the level 
of social information reported in the annual report. This finding supports 
positive association predicted in H1. This result is consistent with the findings 
of prior disclosure research (for example, Haniffa and Cooke 2002, Chen and 
Jaggi 2000) and empirically verifies the influence of non-executive directors 
                                                 
6 A basic approach to detecting collinearity problem is visual inspection of correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. 
Correlation coefficient is considered harmful if it exceeded 0.8 (Farrar & Glauber 1967; Studenmund 1992). A more rigourous 
and diagnostic method widely used is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each of the independent variable (Madalla, 1992). 
According to Neter & Kutner  (1989) collinearity is considered a problem if the VIF exceeds 10. Thus, based on correlation 
matrix and VIF multicollinearity is not likely to influence the regression analysis, since the highest VIF of 2.06 is far 
less than the threshold of 10. 
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on corporate reporting practices. In the Kenyan context, the finding reflects 
the recent corporate reforms emphasis on the role of non-executive directors 
on company boards (Barako et al. 2006)7.  
 
The results in Table 5 indicates that the board gender diversity variable is 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) predictor and therefore H2 is supported. 
Thus, women representation on board is significantly positively associated 
with the extent of corporate social reporting information disclosed in the 
banks annual report.  This result is consistent with earlier studies that 
document empirical evidence that presence of women directors is associated 
with stronger orientation toward corporate social reporting (Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, 1994), and higher levels of corporate social reporting (Siciliano, 
1996). 
 
The proportion of foreign national on the board of banks is not significantly 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent 
with prior research by Wallace and Naser (1995) study of boards dominated 
by directors of non-Chinese (foreigners) background and the level of 
disclosure by Hong Kong listed companies. Foreign nationals on bank boards 
often represent interests of foreign owners, thus their very presence on board 
may act as substitute for enhanced disclosure. The control variable, non-
                                                 
7 As one referee points out, ostensibly while it appears greater disclosure occurs with more non-executive directors,  
it is possible that executive bank directors who give more posts to non-executive directors influence may actually be 
the ones influencing the levels of disclosures. Further research, particularly through a qualitative paradigm, may 
shed light on this possibility. 
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performing loan ratio is not a significant predictor of the level of social 
information disclosed in the annual report.   
 
6 Summary and Implications 
This study examines the influence of corporate governance attributes on the 
level of social information disclosed in banks annual report. It makes three 
important contributions to corporate disclosure research. First, it extends 
prior research to the banking industry, which is often excluded from sample 
companies due to the sector’s more stringent regulatory regime. Second, it 
adds to the limited number of studies that have examined disclosure practices 
in a developing country. Third, it highlights the importance of women board 
representation to improve business communication. 
 
Overall, the level of disclosure of social information disclosed by Kenyan 
banks is very low with a mean of 15%. In particular, banks do not disclose 
important information relating to recruitments, employment of special 
groups, assistance to retiring employees, employees productivity and 
turnover. In addition, very few banks, 12.50% and 0.03% respectively disclose 
information relating to environment policy and environmental activities they 
undertake, while only 3 banks contribute to the national AIDS campaign. The 
low level of communication on social issues in a sector that has profound 
effect on the society through its intermediation role is troubling, since past 
poor performance in the banking sector is attributed to weak disclosure 
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practices. Kenyan banks appear to discern little expectation of the ‘social 
contract’ between banks and society as suggested by legitimacy theory, and 
surprisingly little weight to the voices of financial stakeholder (who in this 
enlightened age may see environmental and social impacts as part of core 
investment risk evaluations) as inferred by the managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory.  But, of course, what is most disappointing about the 
weak disclosure practices of Kenyan banks, when the ethical branch of 
stakeholder theory is evoked, is that the voices of all stakeholders, regardless 
of how distant or close they are to banks, are given short shrift.  Earlier, this 
study noted the difficulty businesses face in satisfying the different needs of 
stakeholders but the results of the study show that on a wide ranging set of 
corporate social reporting criteria Kenyan banks disclosures are very low.  
 
While social reporting is purely voluntary in the Kenyan context, the low 
level of disclosure in the banks annual report suggests that the sector makes 
little contributes in terms of the general societal well being.  This particularly 
evident, for instance none of the banks report issue relating to employment of 
disadvantaged members in the community such as the handicapped or even 
retirees. In addition, very few banks take part in the national HIV/AIDS 
campaign, an epidemic that is having dramatic effect on Kenyan economy. 
Since the concept corporate social responsibility is becoming a global 
phenomena, the banking sector in Kenya may have to do more, and equally 
important disclose their contribution to social and environmental matters.  
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Results of multiple regression analysis indicate that board gender diversity 
defined as ratio of women directors on a board to total number of directors is 
significant determinant of the level of social information disclosed by banks in 
annual reports. This result is consistent with prior finding that board gender 
diversity enhances firm value (Carter et al. 2003). Thus, it is in the best interest 
of banks that qualified and competent women are co-opted onto bank boards 
to realise benefits related to such diversity of the board.  The findings show 
that increased women’s representation at the Board level will significantly 
and positively influence corporate communication. In addition, it is important 
to note, compared to the past few decades the educational gender disparity is 
less, with more women enrolling and qualifying with degree and 
postgraduate qualifications. Clearly, better communication is obtainable in 
the future.   
 
Ratio of non-executive directors on board measured as proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of the board members is positively 
associated with the extent of information disclosed. The Central Bank of 
Kenya, consistent with international practices, in the past few years has been 
encouraging banks to have more non-executive directors on boards. The 
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